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Tuesday, July 12, 2011

WHY HAVE OVER ONE LAKH FARMERS KILLED THEMSELVES IN THE LAST DECADE ? --- P. SAINATH

F A R M      C R I S I S
WHY HAVE OVER ONE LAKH FARMERS KILLED THEMSELVES IN THE LAST DECADE ?
P. SAINATH
Rural Affairs Editor, The Hindu
(Speaker’s Lecture Series: Parliament House, Sept. 6, 2007)

We, as a nation, are in the worst agrarian crisis in four decades.  It is impossible to cover such a large issue in full. So  I am going to be dealing with it in fragments today.  I would like to stress that the crisis is so deep, so advanced that:  firstly, no State, nobody,  is exempt from this and it is not to be seen as the crisis of one State or one Government or one Party.  It is a national crisis and we need to respond to it as such.  It is a huge thing.  In that crisis, the suicides are merely, however tragic, just a symptom and not the disease.   They are a consequence, not the process. 

Millions of livelihoods have been damaged or destroyed in the last 15 years as a result of this crisis.  But you will know, if you look at your media, that it is only in the last three or four years that we widely used the word ‘farm crisis’ or the ‘agrarian crisis.’  Earlier, there was a complete denial of any crisis.  At least today it is established that there is one. 

We can sum it up in one sentence  --  the process driving this crisis: the predatory commercialisation of the countryside (int he words of Prof. K. Nagaraj of the Madras Institute of Development Studies – MIDS). The reduction of all human values to exchange value.  As this process  unleashes itself across agrarian India,  millions of livelihoods have collapsed.  Lakhs of people are migrating towards cities and towns in search of jobs that are not there.  They move towards a status which is neither `worker’ nor `farmer.’ Many will end up as domestic labour,  like over a lakh girls from Jharkhand in this city of Delhi working as domestic servants. 

World-wide crisis of small-holder farms:

However, having said that, I want to say that the crisis is by no means restricted to India.  It is a world-wide crisis of small holder farming.    Small, family farms are getting wiped out across the planet and it has been happening for 20-30 years.  It is just that this has been very intense in India in the last 15 years.  Otherwise, the farm suicides have caused major concern in Korea. Nepal and Sri Lanka have high rates of farm suicides.  In Africa, Burkina Faso, Mali etc. have had high rates of farmers’ suicides as the cotton product there gets wiped out by the United States and EU subsidies. 

Incidentally, suicide rates among farmers in the United States Midwest and other rural regions have also been extremely high from time to time.  In fact, in the eighties, suicide rates amongst farmers in Oklahoma, for instance, were more than twice the national suicide rate for men in the United  States --  and it is rare that rural suicides are higher than urban.  I spent time last year on American farms and could see how they’re going down. 

We are witnessing in many ways the decline and death of the small holder farm.  It is very important that we do something about it because we are the largest nation of small holder farms where the farmer owns that land.  We are also probably the largest body of farm labourers and landless workers. If you look, there is a lesson to be learnt as to what has gone on in the United States

In the 1930s, there were six million family farms in the United States. At that time when India was just a decade or so away from gaining Independence,  over a quarter of the American population lived and worked on those six million farms.  Today, the US has more people in prison than on farms.  It has 2.1 million people in prison and less than that on its 700,000 family farms. 

We are being pushed towards corporate farming:

So what is this process driving towards? In two words:  It is driving us towards corporate farming.  That is the big coming picture of agriculture in India and across the planet. We have been pushed towards corporate farming, a process by which farming is taken out of the hands of the farmers and positioned in the hands of the corporates.  That is exactly what happened in the United States and that is what exactly happened in a large number of other countries.  This process is not being achieved with guns, tanks, bulldozers and lathis. It is done by making farming unviable for the millions of small family farm holders, by just making it so impossible for you to survive in the structures that exist.  But there is a context to this that I am absolutely going to insist on framing that context.  All these unfold in the context of the fastest growing inequality that India has seen in her history as an independent nation.  And understand this, when inequality deepens in society, the farm sector takes the biggest hit.  In any case, it is a disadvantaged sector.  So when inequality widens, the farm sector takes a hit.

Devastating growth of inequality in India:

Ø     Fourth rank in Dollar Billionaires: In India in 2007, I am sure you all will be very thrilled to know, we have the fourth highest number of dollar- billionaires in the planet.  We are ahead of all countries in the number of billionaires except the United States, Germany and Russia.  Incidentally, our billionaires are richer than those of Germany and Russia in terms of net asset worth.  You can look up all these numbers on The World’s Billionaires at www.forbes.com  – the Oracle of global billionaires. 

Ø     126th in Human Development: We have the second richest billionaires in the world in dollars and we have the fourth largest number of billionaires in the planet.  But we are 126th in human development. The same nation that has ranks fourth in billionaires is 126th in human development.  What does it mean to be 126th?  It means that it is better to be a poor person in Bolivia (the poorest nation in South America) or Guatemala or Gabon. They are ahead of us in the UN’s Human Development Index.  You can get all these figures in the Parliament Library from the United Nations Human Development Reports of the last 10 or 15 years.  

Ø     836 million live on less than Rs. 20 a day: We are the emerging ‘tiger economy.’  But life expectancy in our nation is lower than it is in Bolivia, Kazakhstan and Mongolia.  We have 100,000 dollar millionaires, out of whom 25,000 reside in my city of Mumbai, I am proud to say.  Yet, 836 million people in our nation exist on less than Rs. 20/- a day according to the Government of India.  There is no such thing as Indian reality.  There are Indian realities.  There is a multiplicity of realities. 

Ø     Slowing down of infant death rate decline: The growth rate of our country is indeed the envy of many. But the rate of decline of infant mortality actually slowed down in this country in the last 15 years.  The largest number of infant deaths 2.5 million takes place in this country, followed by China

Ø     CEO’s salaries set all time records: Chief Executive Officer ‘packages’ grew like never before in the last ten years.  Indeed, the Prime Minister of this country felt constrained to make some remarks about the salaries of CEOs. You can remember the kind of pasting he came in for in the media as a result of having dared to question that maybe a CEO could live on a million less a year, or whatever it was. But while CEOs salaries have gone through the roof, farm incomes have collapsed. 

Ø     Appalling MPCE of farm households: According to the National Sample Survey, the average monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of the Indian farm household (across zamindars and your half acre wallas), is Rs. 503.  

Ø     Miserable expenditure patterns: Out of that Rs. 503, 55 per cent or more is spent on food, 18 per cent on fuel, clothing and footwear leaving precious little to be spent on education and health.  What is spent on health is twice that of what is spent on education because we now have the 6th most privatised health system in the world. Therefore, the MPCE shows Rs.34 as expenditure on health as against Rs.17 on education.  Rs.17  a month on education means 50 paise a day on education. That is the spending of the Indian farm household. That is the  national average. I will come to state-wise figures a little later.

Ø     Incidentally, we are very proud to tell you that labour productivity in the decade of the reforms went up to 84 per cent according to the ILO. The same ILO report informs me that while labour productivity  went up to 84 per cent, the real wages of labour in manufacturing declined by 22 per cent (at a time when CEO salaries were going through the roof). So,  in the last 15 years, we have seen the unprecedented prosperity of the top of our population. And at the same time, the net per capita availability of foodgrain actually declined for over a decade.

Ø     Rising hunger at the bottom: The State of food insecurity in the world report of the FAO of the United Nations  shows us that from 1995-97 to 1999-2001, India added more newly hungry millions than the rest of the world taken together. Hunger grew at a time when it declined in Ethiopia. A new restaurant opens everyday in some city of this country but as Prof Utsa Patnaik, our leading agricultural economist points out, the average rural family is consuming  100 kgs less than it did 10 years ago.  The availability situation figure is one placed every year in Parliament in the Economic Survey which gives the net per capita availability (NPCA) of foodgrain contained in Table 1.17 (S-21).  You get the numbers all the way from 1951.  You can see how it has declined in the last 15 years.  The NPCA was 510 in 1991, on the cusp of the reforms. That fell to 437 grams by 2003. The 2005 provisional figure was 422 grams. There may be a slight rise in one or another year, but the overall trend has been that of a clear decline over 15 years.

A fall of 70-80 grams sounds trivial  --  until you multiply it by 365 days and then again  by one billion Indians. Then you can see how gigantic the decline is. Since those at the top are eating much better than ever before, it raises the question of what on earth the bottom 40 per cent are eating?

Ø     Two-nation theory passé. Its Two Planets now: Today, for the top 5 per cent of the Indian population, the benchmarks are Western Europe, the USA, Japan and Australia. For the bottom 40 per cent, the benchmarks are the Sub-Saharan Africa (some of whose nations) are ahead of us in literacy.

Ø     Indebtedness has doubled in the past decade: The NSSO’s 59th round tells us that while 26 per cent of farm households were in debt in 1991, that figure went up to over 48 per cent – almost double by 2003.

There have been huge migrations, as I said, as a result of this chaos and collapse of incomes, explosions of cost of living. Why is this framework of inequality so important to our understanding? We are getting further and further into the divide. What do I mean by predatory commercialisation of the countryside?  I will come to that soon.  But many things have happened.
           
Policy-driven devastation of agriculture:

One is that as every Minister and every Prime Minister admits, public investment in agriculture has declined very sharply to the point of collapse over a period of 10-15 years. It is one of the things that the Government now feels that it is trying to reverse. Our foremost agricultural economist, Dr. Utsa Patnaik shows us that while total development expenditure as a share of GDP was fourteen and a half per cent in 1989-90, it was 5.9 per cent by 2005. That is a collapse of Rs.30,000 crore per year or  an income loss of Rs.120,000 crore. I have often felt it’s simpler to send out the Air Force and bomb the villages It would probably cause less lasting damage than that withdrawal  of investment costs us!
           
There has been a crash in employment.

Only the requirement of the last year and a half has somewhat  (but far from adequately) been met by the NREGP, a programme which I am very supportive of. That has not opened up anywhere as much as it should. I hope it deepens and grows because it is  a vital programme for the crisis in the countryside. It is one of the great things that we have done in the last two years. But very far from enough.

SEZs but no land reforms:

Another problem is the rack renting of tenants. In the Andhra Pradesh suicides, you will find that many of those (in some regions) who have committed suicide were actually tenant farmers. Out of the 28 bags of paddy they harvested, they parted with 25 bags as the tenancy or lease rate. If there is a cyclone or damage or anything else, incidentally,  the reparations and the compensation go to the absentee landlords. We have no tenancy reforms. It seems appalling to me that we can clear an SEZ in six months but we cannot do land reforms in 60 years across this country! Except in three states.

Rigging costs in agriculture:

Another issue is the exploding cost of agriculture, a process quite heavily controlled and rigged. Yet another one is the exploitative international agreements that we have entered into  that are severely damaging to the  interests of our farmers. Yet another aspect is the crashing output prices as global corporations have taken control of trade in agriculture commodities and rig prices. Even when While the coffee prices boom in the West, the men and women who grow coffee in Kerala commit suicide, especially between 2000 and 2003.

The suicides are appalling. How many suicides have been there? I do not want to get into the numbers game.  We are coming with a very major story on that in The Hindu in a while. I won’t pre-empt it. However,  you were given last year, I believe,  a figure of over one lakh suicides since 1993. That is a horrifying figure in 10 years. Yet, you will find it wrong. It is not true. For several reasons. I found that four years have been included in the number for which firm data on farm suicides do not exist.  You bring down the average by bringing farm suicides in years which are irrelevant!

We only started collecting farm suicide data from 1995 in the National Crime Records Bureau.  Any new system of reporting takes time. Most States do not report properly for the first two years. It takes time for the States to get into the mode of reporting data. Real or stable data started from around 1997.  So, the over one lakh suicides that you are looking at are not from 1993 to 2003 but they are from 1997 to 2003. That is an appalling figure. It is still a huge under-estimate for a variety of reasons which I will come to.

Suicide figures misleading and confusing:

But what is important is that the numbers are not the crucial issue.  I think even the figure of over one lakh  is appalling enough.  What is frightening is that if you look at the data, two-thirds of the suicides are occurring in half-a-dozen States that account for just about one-third of the country’s population. Most of the suicides are occurring in cash-crop areas. The number of food crop farmers committing suicide is less as compared to those in cash crops. For the last 15 years, we have driven people towards cash crops. We have told them to export. Exports lead to growth. Regardless of the fact who is in power, we have pushed them towards cash crop and now we are paying the price of that movement. We have locked them into volatility of global prices controlled by rapacious corporations. It is often done by corporations whom your farmers cannot see, who are not accountable to your people.
           
The other frightening thing is that the five or six States are also, in  a sense, contiguous. There are other States which are pretty bad. These are the worst states. Maharashtra  is the worst. Some of these States are  showing an ascending trend. Some show a descending trend. What is frightening is that in some of the States showing an ascending trend, their numbers might double in six years.

Zero farm suicides in Vidharbha?

Farmer suicides in Vidharbha stopped entirely in August because the news came in July  that the Prime Minister was to visit them. So, people thoughtfully stopped committing suicide. There was not a single suicide in Vidharbha in August. In official count, at least. They knew the Prime Minister was coming. Everybody said: “We will not commit suicide till he leaves.” This is a nation deluding itself. It does not help you. I am not trying to point at one Chief Minister or one party Government. It is a national crisis. The more honest we are with ourselves, the better positioned we are to sort it out.
           
What do the figures actually suggest? If we project further the figures of the National Crimes Record Bureau, it is closer to about one-and-a-half lakh  suicides in the 1997-2005 period. And that excludes eight categories of people  because, for instance, in this country  whatever you do, whatever laws you pass, our machinery will not   accept women as farmers because there is no land in their name, there are no property rights for them.

Many suicides not recorded as farm suicides:

In Anantapur district of Andhra Pradesh, 45 per cent of farm suicides in 2001-02 were women farmers. Many of the households in Anantapur rural areas are women-headed since the men have migrated. There are much larger numbers. Even nationally, 19 per cent or nearly one-fifth households in this country are women-headed. But we do not count women as farmers. We count them as the wives of farmers.  So,  it is counted as a suicide but not as a farmer’s suicide.  Of course, farm labourer suicides will never be counted in the list of farm suicides, so that brings it down further.

Incidentally, countless eldest sons have not been counted as farmers committing suicide because, in our traditional society, the land remains in the name of the aged-old father, who may be 75-80,  until he dies. So, the elder son may be 50 or 51. He is running the farm. He faces the pressure. He  cracks and kills himself. The tehsildar says that this man is not a farmer because there is no farm in his name. In Yavatmal district last month, every single claim of suicide was rejected by a six-member ‘independent’ Committee consisting of top Government officers in the district plus two non-officials chosen by the government!

Many of these cases were rejected on the basis that there is no land in those names.  The guy was the eldest son, he was running it and looking after perhaps even three family units.  But the land was not in his name.  How do we accept him as a farmer?  That is the criteria.  I could go on about that.  If you die and if you are found to be in debt, that  debt has to be a bank debt.  If it is a private money lender debt, it is not accepted. The Committee in Yavatmal will not accept it.  They will ask:  what is the record on that?  There is no document to show it.  In this way, thousands of people have been kept on the list of suicides but not in the list of farmers suicides.   
           
There is also misclassification. There are migrant farmers who are not counted in it.  People leave the place and kill themselves in the city.  I do not even want to conjecture what the real figure would be.  It is impossible physically.  Secondly, I think the number (the official count, however flawed)  is appalling enough to move this nation.  It should move this nation.  If we have only these Government numbers, I will accept them at face value.  If you can accept that it is a horrible figure, we should move the nation forward. 

Common factors across regions:

What is common in these areas where the crisis is taking place?  Cash crop, high water stress, huge indebtedness way above the national average.  If you make a map of indebtedness of India and the map of all suicides, they will converge very neatly.  The highest number of indebted households in the country is in Andhra Pradesh which is at 82 per cent, Kerala has 64 per cent and Karnataka has 62 per cent of all farm households in debt. The list is endless. You can see how the suicide map matches that of indebtedness which is one of the important single major causes.  

I would like to say that almost every suicide has a multiplicity of causes, not just one.  What we do in recording them, though, is to record the last cause.  I am indebted. My son drops out of college.  I am unable to get my daughter married and I am humiliated by the money lender every day when I go to the market.  My crop collapses and the bank refuses to give me a loan.  I go home getting drunk.  I fight with my wife and then commit suicide.   The next day, it is recorded that the reason for the suicide is that he had a fight with his wife and, so, he killed himself.  The last cause gets recorded. That is natural and that is how it is structured. But it conceals more than it tells.

The other common thing in the suicide-hit regions is withdrawal of bank credit.  Agriculture tends to be more deregulated in these areas as in parts of Vidharbha and Maharashtra.   You have a very high cultivation cost.  That too, is common in these areas.    Extremely high cultivation costs.  In Vidharbha, in 1991, it cost Rs. 2500 to cultivate an acre of cotton.  Today it costs over Rs. 13,000 per acre using the new BT brand.  You are talking about a 500 per cent increase in the cultivation cost per acre.  It is killing. It cannot be borne.  

If you want to understand how gigantic input costs are, if you want to understand how massive is the industry for seeds which we have left open to a handful of corporations to control and loot,  see what is happening in Andhra Pradesh.  You would understand how major a cost it is. 

Andhra Pradesh, my own home State, is so proud of its software exports.   But, the seed and other input  industry of Andhra Pradesh is worth more than AP’s software exports.  That is how big, how huge, the seed industry  is.  People in this country spend more on seed than AP earns exporting software.

We are running after software markets overseas, which is fine, but while allowing the seed market to be taken away absolutely by a bunch of corporations. Which is not fine at all. That is how I said that we are moving already, at this level, towards corporate farming.

Farm incomes have collapsed:  

Look at income.  Income collapse was a major part of the crisis.   In several regions, farm incomes have simply collapsed.   The national average monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) of the Indian farm household, as I told you, was Rs. 503.  It is pretty close to the below poverty figure of Rs. 425 or so of rural India.  Six States on an average have been below the poverty line It is below Rs. 425 figure. Five or six States exist in the country like that. 

There are many households existing on a monthly per capita expenditure of Rs. 225.  This is according to the National Sample Survey Organisation.  The per capita monthly expenditure is Rs. 225 which translates into Rs. 8 a day.  In that, you are going to manage your food, clothing, footwear, education, health and transport.  What does it leave for any kind of life?    You are always in debt.  55 per cent has gone to food, 18 per cent to fuel, footwear and clothing.  In all these areas, you will find a  very high proportion of school and college dropouts.   People with B.Sc. degrees have dropped out to work as farm labourers on the family farm in order to get it somehow going, while our Agricultural Universities have simply taken up the job of doing research for other parties like private corporations  but not for our farmers any more.    

Elite view of the rural crisis:

How do the elites look at the crisis at the bottom?  Let me quote from a leading economic newspaper of our country.  One of its commentators says this with some disappointment.  “The bottom 400 million are a disappointment.”  Why? They do not buy enough.  I do not know what they will buy with Rs. 8 as per capita expenditure.  She says that they do not buy enough.  But they have a responsibility.  “It is a difficult market to tap,”  the commentator concludes. 

The Vidharbha crisis:

What about Vidharbha from where so much of reporting has been done on the suicides in the last few years?   As Mrs. Alva has said, what you see in the media is very little.  Dozens of local journalists have kept this issue alive.  They have to be given credit for it.  How many suicides have there been in Vidharbha?  Have they declined?  According to one section of the media, they have stopped.  The government has in fact put out several sets of figures over time which are quite contradictory.  The Government has not put its name or signature to any figure of decline at the highest level.  Why?  It is because the Government will be in serious trouble. 

There is an order from the Nagpur Bench of the High Court that the State Government must maintain a website with all the figures.  It is in response to a public interest litigation.  If you look at the Government website, you do not need to read any of the reports.  The figures in the website are so obscene and what do they do to bring a decline?  Let me tell you the actual number from the Commissioner of Amravati’s own report and how these are then presented.

In Vidharbha, the number of total suicides, not the farming suicides, in six districts was not 1500.  Since 2001, in the crisis years, it was not 2000, it was not 1300 and it was not 1700.  The police stations record it as 15,980 for the six districts.   Not all of these are farm suicides.  But here is the fun.  From 15,980, they will bring it down to 578 or whatever figure is finally arrived at.  We can bring this down.  Incidentally, these are 100 per cent rural districts.   But the final tabulation shows that less than 20 per cent of these 15,000 suicides  were farmers   --  in 100 per cent rural districts!  It is a mystery then,  who those committing suicide were and are.  These were not industrial districts.  If just 2939 were farmers, that is less than 20 per cent of 15,980, then who were they?  It almost as if only farmers were doing well! Indeed, very well. Everybody else is committing suicide.

Largest state distress survey ever:

I give full credit to the Maharashtra Government for one thing.  They did the biggest study on farming households in the state.  It is only that people should take some time to read that study.  It will just chill you to the marrow of your bones.  Thanks to the Prime Minister’s visit due to which everybody got busy.  They surveyed every one of the 17.64 lakh households (nearly ten million human beings).  Every single farm household was surveyed in the six districts of Vidharbha the government believes are affected. (In all, Vidharbha has 11 districts.)   What does that figure show? These are figures based on the survey which appear in the  report of the Commissioner of Amravati (which  document I have promised to give you.)   Five of the six affected districts come under the Commissioner of Amravati. But the data he is citing includes even the sixth, that is Wardha district.

It (Amravati Commissioner’s report) says that:

Ø     close to 75 per cent of the farm households in these nearly two million households (17.64 lakh) are in distress.
 
Ø     It says that 4,31,000 households, if you take the rural households having five to six people in each household, are in “maximum distress.”   That is the word of the Government.  The other category is “medium distress.”  I have no idea what that means.  But it admits 75 per cent of the households are in distress of one kind or the other.  

Ø     Astonishingly, over three lakh families are having severe problems on the marriage of daughters which is a big cause in several suicides.   Over three lakh farmers are not able to get one or more daughters married.  This is an explosive situation.

Ø     The Government’s own study shows that indebtedness was also a factor in 93 per cent of the suicides that it looked at. 

Ø     Last year suicides were supposed to have declined after the package.  Last year the police station records show 2,832 suicides as against 2,425 in 2005.  It is an increase of 407, which is a very significant increase. Because that’s an increase of over 60 suicides per district in each of the six districts  in just one year. 

And there’s a lot more in similar vein.

How do they then make out a ‘decline’? I think it is the Indian national genius of handling numbers.  I just love numbers.  The first category (police station records) states 2,832 suicides last year.  The second column says, out of these “farmers’ suicides” from 2,832 it falls to 800-odd.  The third column says suicides by “farmers’ relatives” as if others on farm are not farmers.  That becomes 1600.  So, suicide by farmers is different from suicides in farming households!.  Then comes “cases under inquiry.”  Then, other tables which list cases due to “agrarian distress.”  With each column the number comes down.  The final column is the masterpiece.  It does not exist anywhere in the planet.  We have a column called “eligible suicides”, like eligible bachelors or brides, etc.  It means those suicides where the families are deemed by government to be eligible for compensation.  So, from 2,832 it comes down to 578 in the last column.  It is this last figure of ‘eligible’ suicides that is put out by officials as the suicides figure!

This month (August was the month just concluded) we do not have suicides at all because if you let our mathematicians pursue it further, they will redefine suicides out of existence.  But the total number keeps increasing.  You can see it.  This year when there were no suicides, or suicides were in steep decline, there were 700 plus suicides according to the Government of Maharashtra website.  Why does not the Government put its signature to the number? It is because that website is maintained under the court order.  Then you are running into serious problems if you contradict your own data.  We can play games with that endlessly. 

Misery in the households:

I’d like to narrate three personal episodes from the affected households.  For me the most painful thing is that second and third suicides are happening in the same households.  In the 700 (suicide-hit) households that I have gone to and seen over the years, the most hurting thing is that when you are leaving the household, when you make eye contact with the lady of the house or the eldest daughter, you know – do not ask me how I know – that she is also planning to take her life.  You know that for all your boastfulness about the might of the Press and the power of the pen, I cannot do a damn thing to stop them because that is how we are today as a society.  That is the most painful thing for me.  I’ve started avoiding that eye contact because I do not want to see in the person’s eyes that she is also going to take her life.  When a young widow takes her life, she might kill her girl child also because she does not want that child forced into prostitution. 

Last year, when Prime Minister came, there was total chaos because everybody was kept on notice, because the Prime Minister was really worried about what was going on.  He took a trip which was not really scheduled.  One month before he came there, I was in the house of Gosavi Pawar. This was a very different kind of Pawar, a less privileged Pawar, an adivasi Pawar and not to be confused with more the illustrious Pawars.  Gosavi Pawar was from a Banjara family.  The clan is so poor. 

Incidentally, that day I was sitting in his house I had also read about the wedding of daughter of India’s richest man, Lakshmi Mittal at a cost of 60 million dollars or pounds.  It is obscene in whichever currency it is translated.  Poor man, Mr. Mittal,  he could not get a wedding hall in Paris! It is very difficult to get one there in that season. So, he hired the Palace of Versailles and held the wedding there.  But in the house of Gosavi Pawar, the clan is so very poor.  They had come all over the country for the wedding and decided to have three weddings at the same time in order to afford them.  They decided to have three weddings at the same time because people had come from different regions and states.  They had all gathered there.  Gosavi Pawar, the patriarch of that clan, was unable to raise the money required for the sarees for those weddings.  Humiliated by the moneylender, by the bank manager, and others, Gosavi Pawar took his life. 
           
I saw two things.  One that depressed me enormously and one that inspired me about the poor people of this country.  One that depressed me enormously is the poor household had three weddings and a funeral on the same day, because they could not cancel the wedding.  It would have bankrupted the clan had they gone back to Rajasthan, Gujarat and Karnataka or wherever and come again.  So, they held the weddings.  The brides and bridegrooms wept.  The most heart- breaking moment was when the wedding procession went out and on the highway met the funeral procession.  Dr. Swaminathan would remember that when he came to Yavatmal he encountered a similar situation, when suicides were being brought to the hospitals even as the National Commission on Farmers (NCF) team  were holding discussions with the Government officials.  So, the wedding procession ran into the funeral procession of Gosavi Pawar.  Then, people who were carrying his body ran into the fields and hid so that they would not cast a bad omen on the wedding. 
           
But there was also something very inspiring. Some of the poorest people on planet Earth made those weddings happen.  Everybody contributed Rs. 5, quarter kilo of  wheat, half a kilo of rice, one sheaf of banana, a coconut, whatever they could.  They held those weddings.  They did not have the resources to do it, I am afraid, in the Palace of Versailles.  But they held those weddings by community action, by public action.  I felt so proud at that moment that our people showed the decency and dignity that the elite have so completely forgotten. 
           
When governments cheat on poll promises:

Coming back to ‘eligible suicides’ in Vidharbha, there is nothing that prevents the Government of Maharashtra from implementing its poll promise of Rs. 2700 per quintal of cotton.  What did they do after coming to power? I am not singling out one Government.  Let me make it very clear agriculture is in desperate shape across the country.  All Governments are culpable.  Everybody is fragile.  No State is exempt.  But in this particular case, they made a promise of Rs. 2700 rupees, but they lowered it by Rs. 500.  They withdrew Rs. 500 of the so-called ‘advance bonus’ payment. 

With that, it removed Rs. 1200 crores from the farmers.  After removing Rs. 1200 crores from the farmers, the Chief Minister announced a package of Rs. 1,075 crores.  A package of Rs. 1,075 crore is being given to people from whom you have taken away Rs. 1200 crore! 

US-EU subsidies destroy cotton prices:

At the same time, the US, the European Union were drowning their cotton growers in subsidies.  Cotton growers of the US are not small farmers, they are corporations.  How many cotton growers do we have in Maharashtra? It is in millions.  How many cotton growers are there in US? It is 20,000.  When we removed Rs. 1200 crore from our farmers, how much did the US give to its corporations?

On a crop value of 3.9 billion dollars, the United States gave its cotton growers a subsidy of 4.7 billion dollars.  It destroyed the bottom of the international cotton market.  The cotton price at the New York exchange ruled at 90 to 100 cents in 1994-95 fell to around 40 cents and from that date suicides began all over the world as prices crashed and farmers ran up horrible losses. 

In Burkina Faso, hundreds of cotton farmers killed themselves.  In July 2003, the Presidents of Burkina Faso and Mali wrote an article in New York Times, “Your Farm Subsidies are Strangling Us”.  We were not able to take action against such subsidies, them.  While our duties on cotton are 10 per cent,  if you are a Mumbai textile magnate, then you do not pay even that ten per cent.  You get it waived in lieu of export of garments.  Incidentally, if I am a Mumbai textile magnate, I can even get the cotton free because private corporations dumping cotton in India  would give me six months’ credit.  In six months credit, I can run the entire cycle from cotton to cotton garment.

So, I am essentially getting an interest-free loan from you which I return in six months and I have made huge profits.  All these games are played around the lives of millions of people. 

Role of the media:

For me the saddest thing is your (Mrs. Alva’s) comment on the media. As a journalist, I totally endorse this.  The saddest thing last year that happened was when less than six ‘national’ journalists were covering the suicides in Vidharbha.  Five hundred and twelve accredited journalists were fighting for space to cover the Lakme India Fashion Week.  In that Fashion Week programme, the models were displaying cotton garments while the men and women who grew the cotton were killing themselves at a distance of one hour’s flight from Nagpur in the Vidharbha region.  The irony of it should have been a news story, but nobody did that story except one or two journalists locally. 

We withdrew the money of the advance bonus of Rs. 500 a quintal at the time when the US and EU were increasing their subsidies. I went last year to US and visited American farms.  Including corporate style dairies.  The subsidy per cow every day is twice your National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme minimum wage. It is around three dollars per cow which is Rs. 120.  Double your National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme wage which is Rs. 60.  That is why my friend, Vijay Jawandia from Wardha, put it so beautifully in a television interview.  He was asked – Jawandia saab what is the dream of the Indian farmer? He said the dream of the Indian farmer is to be born as an American cow because they are getting three times the support that we do.  We have locked the farmer into global price shocks while removing whatever safety nets they had.  We have not been able to fight the EU-US cotton subsidies.  

Seed companies are being allowed to run riot: 

We have deregulated agriculture to an extent where the quality of seed has now been graded much lower.  In the sense, when you bought a bag of seed, on the back of seed, it will be stamped – 85 per cent germination rate guaranteed.  That is now 60 per cent.  It means if a village buys 10,000 bags of seed, they are paying for 10,000 bags, but they are getting 6,000 bags because we have lowered the standards through MOUs with companies.  The seed industry, as I said earlier, is bigger than software exports.   The agricultural universities have collapsed.  The extension machinery, as the Government of India itself says, is in a state of complete disrepair.  At the time the advance bonus was withdrawn, we begged the government: Please do not do this as suicides could double.  We were wrong.   In some places, they tripled.   We begged - do not do this, do not do this, do not remove this, it will really kill these people who are in a very precarious stage. 

Vidharbha Vs. Mumbai:

Incidentally, by the end of 2005, there was a unique G.O. in Maharashtra. I do not know if you are aware of it. In Maharashtra, it has 14 hours’ or 15 hours’ power cut whereas the best localities of  Mumbai have never a problem of power cut, not even for one minute.   The beautiful people cannot be subjected to power cuts.  Incidentally, a 15-minute power cut in Mumbai would give two hours of power to all the 11 districts of Vidharbha, but the children of Vidharbha were not given that concession even during the exams.   That is why Vidharbha’s performance in HSC exams will always be worse, though the topper is from Vidharbha.  So alongside the withdrawal of the bonus, a new G.O. came.  We have exemptions for power cuts.  Do you know what was exempted in the new GO of 2005?  Post-mortem centres were exempted from power cuts because so many people were being wielded in for post-mortem.  They exempted post mortem centres from power cuts along with Armed Forces, Police Stations, Fire Brigade etc.  

Right now, as I speak to you, there is a second sad part – we are in the spraying season.  There are three seasons when suicides shoot up.  It is not common across the year.  In some months it is very low. In the spike seasons they are very high. The first spike comes in the credit season when the farmer goes out in April-May, looking for the money to buy their inputs for the new season, trying to get that Rs. 8,000/- or whatever amount it is.  I have covered farmers who have committed suicides because they could not get Rs. 8,000/- at a decent rate of interest in 2003 and in early 2004. Then, I have gone back to my house as an urban middle class professional and got a letter from a bank, offering me a loan to buy a Mercedes Benz at six per cent rate of interest with no collateral required.  What kind of justice is there in that society? Where is the humanity, where is the compassion and, above all, where is our sense of outrage?  Where is the outrage about this, that I can buy a Mercedes Benz for six per cent rate of interest without collateral whereas a farmer who could buy a productive investment like a tractor is bankrupted by the terms of loan?  There is no fairness in the system at all. 

Credit expansion --  to whose benefit?  

The  indebtedness of Indian peasants, as I said, has doubled and I gave you the figures from some of the major States.  We have been told repeatedly that there is a massive credit expansion and indeed there is.  I can assure you that it is not going to the farmer.  Some of you know very well as to which cooperatives it goes to and who runs what.  All these things are very well known.  What has happened to the credit expansion?  How do you expand credit when you have closed 3,500 banks in the rural areas?  Rural areas have witnessed the closure of over 3,000 banks between 1993 and 2002. And more since then.  Private banks are only now beginning to come in. It was only the nationalised banks which worked in the rural areas.  There expansion of food production associated with the ‘Green Revolution’ would actually not have taken place without the banks being there and providing the credit for the farmer to do that.  Banks have systemically withdrawn from credit and bank branches have closed down in thousands.

There has been a diversion of credit to the upper middle classes, the consumption of all of us in the cities indeed.  The so-called Gramina Banks are playing with tens of crores of rupees in the Mumbai Stock Exchange!  The undermining and re-defining of what we call priority sector lending has a lot to do with it.  We redefine it. Under agricultural loan, you can buy a Qualis or Tavera or Scorpio or other luxury vehicle  --  as an agricultural loan!  While non-agricultural loans go to farmers who pay non-agricultural rates of interest,  non-farmers are buying Taveras or Hero Hondas and Qualis with ‘agricultural loans’  and this at reduced rates of interest.  This is a very widely documented thing and I could place everything before you.  It is also very important in the whole crisis. 

Agriculture is not an island: Do not disconnect farming from the rest of what is happening.  The cost of living expenses have simply exploded across this nation.  Today, health is the second fastest growing component of rural family debt.  Health is the second fastest growing component because we have the sixth most privatised health system in the world.  If you look at the NSS data, it suggests that nearly one in every five Indians, nearly two hundred million human beings, no longer seek medical attention of any kind because they cannot afford it.  This is not because of accessibility or distance.  It is because they cannot afford it.  The same nation boasts of boosting ‘medical tourism.’  But that is the situation. 

The farmer is hit on all fronts.  The situation of farm labour is even worse.  The landless labourers’ plight is even worse, but he is not tied to the land (except where bonded). So, the entire series of processes is buffeting the farmers in every case.    Last year, Andhra Pradesh started jailing  elderly farmers who were unable to ay their debts. Now, the AP Government has called a halt to it.  They were put in jails for debt.  Seventy-four-years or seventy-five-year-old farmers were put in jails, but that is now being stopped. 

India pioneered the concept of ‘social banking.’  It was a Gandhian idea.  It was recognised that there were some operations, some classes of people, who you advanced loans without expectations of huge profits. Like marginal or subsistence farmers. We have withdrawn from that idea of social banking.  We all talk about moneylenders.  One of the things which I want to tell you is that the face of the moneylender has completely changed. 

The new moneylenders of the countryside:

Please do not focus too much on your village sahucar.  Sure, he is an exploitative creature. He is also a very pathetic creature in the new dispensation.   A whole new class of moneylenders have come to the countryside.  The village sahucar, the small sahucar is committing suicide because his clients are bankrupt.  Some  clients have migrated and they have run away and nobody is repaying his debt.  Who then are the new moneylenders?  They are input dealers, the people who sell seeds and who sell pesticides, fertiliser and other inputs to the farmer.

The people who own the shops that are selling the seeds are millionaires now. When you come to pesticides, input costs have simply exploded. Let me give you an idea to prove how major it is. When we spoke about interest waiver, I begged at that time: “Do not do the  interest waiver. It will be the cooperative banks that will benefit. If you want to do a waiver, do a loan waiver.”  After all, we have waived loans of thousands of crores of rupees for a handful of industrialists.

A non-performing Who’s Who:

Look at your Non-performing assets (NPA) list.  It is a “Who’s Who” of the Indian industry. Running to tens of thousands of crores. But we could not waive the loan of Rs.25,000 per Vidharbha farmer which would have wiped out  80 per cent of their bank debt. I begged at that time when the ‘relief package’ was being formulated. I said: “It is more packing than package.”  I said that the cooperative banks would take the money. Indeed, the cooperative banks are, for the first time in 10 years, on a hiring spree because they have so much money. They have got a Rs.712 crore gift!

We also gave a moratorium  of two years instead of giving a loan waiver. What is the result? The two-year moratorium comes to an end in March 2008. With the existing loan plus the pending loan plus the current loan, the farmer is in for a gigantic shock in March 2008. There is no chance of repaying. But we did not do that. Only in the case of Tamil Nadu, there was a major waiver. You can reason out why Tamil Nadu was given that privilege. I am very happy that they were given that privilege and I just hope that  that privilege would be extended to all the others and the other Governments do the same.

Input costs now killing:

Input costs have gone up to a point where there is no return. If you look at cash crops, you can find it. I will just take input cost in respect of  seeds. Take the case of di-ammonia phosphate (DAP). One bag of DAP cost Rs.120 in 1991. It costs four times as much now.  Seeds were available at Rs.7 a kilogram of local variety. I mean, in Vidharbha, local cotton seeds were available for Rs.7 per kilo. You could get the bill (for transactions of that time) even now. Just Rs. 7 for a whole kilo. It was Rs.1800 for the BT cotton  seed (per 450 gram packet) in 2004 before the Andhra Pradesh Government took Monsanto to court. It got the price dropped down to Rs.725. I give full credit to the Government of Andhra Pradesh for having taken that action. Today, the utility prices have gone up; electricity prices have gone up and the farmer is buffeted by the entire series of price shocks.  At the same time, the output prices have crashed. The little district of Wayanad in Kerala  lost Rs.6,000 crore on two products of coffee and pepper which are not doing that badly at the global level. In just  four or five years, they lost that much. Somebody else is making the money because they have been locked into a trade where the Spices Board, all our institutions, are operating on behalf of the private corporations and not on behalf of the farmers.

When  I went to the Coffee Board in Wayanad, Kerala, they were very nice to me. The moment I entered their office, the Coffee Board people offered me a cup of tea! That is how they promote coffee. The farmers in this part of Kerala are growing the coffee. Coffee does not grow in most Western climates. Your farmer is growing coffee and he gets pathetically less than 10 per cent of the turnover of what goes on at the global level. In 2001-02, thousands of people were beguiled into growing Vanilla. Why?  It fetched Rs.4300 a kilogram at the time  -  at the start.  This is also one of the tricks of the corporate farming and contract farming. It fetched Rs.4300, per kg meaning thereby $100 per kg of Vanilla. That was the price the farmer got. I do not know what is the exact price today. I think it is around Rs.86 a kg. It is not a fluctuation. That is an annihilation. This volatility has killed them. However, we have chained our farmers to all these things. Are there solutions to these problems? Yes, I have not covered a lot of issues. I can take the questions from you on that.

We can turn it around:

For one thing, I would appeal to you to read the reports of the National Commission on Farmers.  There is something very important about the reports of the NCF. They have wide acceptance. Almost every major farm union in this country has supported it regardless of party – whether it is the Congress or the Communist or the BJP or the Dravidian parties. Across the political spectrum, people have supported the recommendations of the NCF. Then, what prevents us from moving ahead on at least the major recommendations?  What prevents us from creating a Price Stabilisation Fund for important agricultural commodities the way we have it for petroleum. We do have a Price Stabilisation Fund in the case of petroleum. The State kicks in when the price becomes unbearable and withdraws when it stabilises. What stops us from using social banking techniques?

There is a rule, a law in this country that 1 per cent of all loans (at 4 per cent interest only) has to go to the poorest of the poor. Over the last 10 years, we have not even fulfilled that one per cent, according to the bank unions of this country. The industrywide average is 0.25 per cent! We have given no protection to the farmers against dumping and the Western subsidies. We have not sought the revival of the agricultural universities as the National Commission has appealed for. We could do a five-year credit cycle. You  can give the farmer a loan over a five-year cycle instead of  making him go back on his knees to the corrupt bank manager every six months, every season. In five years, you will have two good years, two bad years and one neutral year. So you might manage.

There are many such recommendations which we could use. They are really very sincere ones. As I said, it is not  politically difficult to get them accepted. They have been accepted across the farming political spectrum. You are talking about 600 million people here. There are three broad principles which are on the larger canvass.

Ø     First, do not treat agriculture as a headache or a cancer. It is not. It is central to the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of  people. We have to approach it with reverence for what it represents.

Ø     Second, declare agriculture as a public service and treat it as such. Those who work in agriculture, they lose out a lot. Average incomes in agriculture are much lower than any other sector. Let them be compensated for the food they put on our table.  They lose out a lot. Those remaining in the sector should be compensated by society.

Ø     Third, let us end the hypocrisy of subsidies. There is no part on the globe where agriculture exists without State subsidies, without State intervention. In fact, the richer the country, the greater the subsidies  --  but they are not going to the farmers  --  they are going to the corporations. What we give our farmers does not even  qualify for subsidy but as pathetic life supports. Let us not remove them. Let us honour those who put food on our table.

            I just want to tell you one thing. Many causes have been advanced why farmers are killing themselves. One is, they are killing themselves to get compensation. This disgusting explanation is in vogue in Maharashtra. I do not know what to say about it. What do you do with Rs. one lakh? Do you have a wild party when you are dead? Another thing is they are called mentally unstable. Well, I might be mentally unstable and depressed if three people in my family have killed themselves  and one is starving. However, the Government in its wisdom last year constituted a mano vaigyanik dal ( A team of medical experts). Psychiatrists, psychologists, some very good people, very fine people, highly qualified intellectuals, were sent to the villages to find out why the farmers are killing themselves. They did a lot of research and studies. Finally, one old farmer got up and addressed these top doctors from top institutions. He said typically in the Indian fashion: “Such an honour to have such big people come to my small village. I honour you. I touch your feet. You have asked us so many questions. You have given us such good advice. You have asked us this question: Do you drink too much? Do you fight with your wife? You have given us good advice. You have said: Do not drink too much. Do not fight with your wife. Do yoga. Remove your stress.” He said: “Ask us one more question. Ask us why the farmers of this country, who place the nation’s food on its table, are starving?”  There was total silence. One of the doctors told a journalist much later: “We shut up. There was nothing to say. We had all the answers but he had the right question.”         

Sunday, June 19, 2011

2011:An Arab Springtime?- Samir Amin


2011:An Arab Springtime?- Samir Amin–(19.6.11)
The year 2011 began with a series of shattering, wrathful, explosions from the Arab peoples. Is this springtime the inception of a second “awakening of the Arab world?” Or will these revolts bog down and finally prove abortive—as was the case with the first episode of that awakening, which was evoked in my book L’éveil du Sud (Paris: Le temps des cerises, 2008). If the first hypothesis is confirmed, the forward movement of the Arab world will necessarily become part of the movement to go beyond imperialist capitalism on the world scale. Failure would keep the Arab world in its current status as a submissive periphery, prohibiting its elevation to the rank of an active participant in shaping the world.
It is always dangerous to generalize about the “Arab world,” thus ignoring the diversity of objective conditions characterizing each country of that world. So I will concentrate the following reflections on Egypt, which is easily recognized as playing and having always played a major role in the general evolution of its region.
Egypt was the first country in the periphery of globalized capitalism that tried to “emerge.” Even at the start of the 19th century, well before Japan and China, the Viceroy Mohammed Ali had conceived and undertaken a program of renovation for Egypt and its near neighbors in the Arab Mashreq [Mashreq means “East,” i.e., eastern North Africa and the Levant, ed.]. That vigorous experiment took up two-thirds of the 19th century and only belatedly ran out of breath in the 1870′s, during the second half of the reign of the Khedive Ismail. The analysis of its failure cannot ignore the violence of the foreign aggression by Great Britain, the foremost power of industrial capitalism during that period. Twice, in [the naval campaign of] 1840 and then by taking control of the Khedive’s finances during the 1870′s, and then finally by military occupation in 1882, England fiercely pursued its objective: to make sure that a modern Egypt would fail to emerge. Certainly the Egyptian project was subject to the limitations of its time since it manifestly envisaged emergence within and through capitalism, unlike Egypt’s second attempt at emergence—which we will discuss further on. That project’s own social contradictions, like its underlying political, cultural, and ideological presuppositions, undoubtedly had their share of responsibility for its failure. The fact remains that without imperialist aggression those contradictions would probably have been overcome, as they were in Japan.
Beaten, emergent Egypt was forced to undergo nearly forty years (1880-1920) as a servile periphery, whose institutions were refashioned in service to that period’s model of capitalist/imperialist accumulation. That imposed retrogression struck, over and beyond its productive system, the country’s political and social institutions. It operated systematically to reinforce all the reactionary and medievalistical cultural and ideological conceptions that were useful for keeping the country in its subordinate position.
The Egyptian nation—its people, its elites—never accepted that position. This stubborn refusal in turn gave rise to a second wave of rising movements which unfolded during the next half-century (1919-1967). Indeed, I see that period as a continuous series of struggles and major forward movements. It had a triple objective: democracy, national independence, social progress. Three objectives—however limited and sometimes confused were their formulations—inseparable one from the other. An inseparability identical to the expression of the effects of modern Egypt’s integration into the globalized capitalist/imperialist system of that period. In this reading, the chapter (1955-1967) of Nasserist systematization is nothing but the final chapter of that long series of advancing struggles, which began with the revolution of 1919-1920.
The first moment of that half-century of rising emancipation struggles in Egypt had put its emphasis—with the formation of the Wafd in 1919—on political modernization through adoption (in 1923) of a bourgeois form of constitutional democracy (limited monarchy) and on the reconquest of independence. The form of democracy envisaged allowed progressive secularization—if not secularism in the radical sense of that term—whose symbol was the flag linking cross and crescent (a flag that reappeared in the demonstrations of January and February 2011). “Normal” elections then allowed, without the least problem, not merely for Copts to be elected by Muslim majorities but for those very Copts to hold high positions in the State.
The British put their full power, supported actively by the reactionary bloc comprising the monarchy, the great landlords, and the rich peasants, into undoing the democratic progress made by Egypt under Wafdist leadership. In the 1930′s the dictatorship of Sedki Pasha, abolishing the democratic 1923 constitution, clashed with the student movement then spearheading the democratic anti-imperialist struggles. It was not by chance that, to counter this threat, the British Embassy and the Royal Palace actively supported the formation in 1927 of the Muslim Brotherhood, inspired by “Islamist” thought in its most backward “Salafist” version of Wahhabism as formulated by Rachid Reda—the most reactionary version, antidemocratic and against social progress, of the newborn “political Islam.”
The conquest of Ethiopia undertaken by Mussolini, with world war looming, forced London to make some concessions to the democratic forces. In 1936 the Wafd, having learned its lesson, was allowed to return to power and a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed. The Second World War necessarily constituted a sort of parenthesis. But a rising tide of struggles resumed already on February 21, 1946 with the formation of the “worker-student bloc,” reinforced in its radicalization by the entry on stage of the communists and of the working-class movement. Once again the Egyptian reactionaries, supported by London, responded with violence and to this end mobilized the Muslim Brotherhood behind a second dictatorship by Sedki Pasha—without, however, being able to silence the protest movement. Elections had to be held in 1950 and the Wafd returned to power. Its repudiation of the 1936 Treaty and the inception of guerrilla actions in the Suez Canal Zone were defeated only by setting fire to Cairo (January 1952), an operation in which the Muslim Brotherhood was deeply involved.
A first coup d’état in 1952 by the “Free Officers,” and above all a second coup in 1954 by which Nasser took control, was taken by some to “crown” the continual flow of struggles and by others to put it to an end. Rejecting the view of the Egyptian awakening advanced above, Nasserism put forth an ideological discourse that wiped out the whole history of the years from 1919 to 1952 in order to push the start of the “Egyptian Revolution” to July 1952. At that time many among the communists had denounced this discourse and analyzed the coups d’état of 1952 and 1954 as aimed at putting an end to the radicalization of the democratic movement. They were not wrong, since Nasserism only took the shape of an anti-imperialist project after the Bandung Conference of April 1955. Nasserism then contributed all it had to give: a resolutely anti-imperialist international posture (in association with the pan-Arab and pan-African movements) and some progressive (but not “socialist”) social reforms. The whole thing done from above, not only “without democracy” (the popular masses being denied any right to organize by and for themselves) but even by “abolishing” any form of political life. This was an invitation to political Islam to fill the vacuum thus created. In only ten short years (1955-1965) the Nasserist project used up its progressive potential. Its exhaustion offered imperialism, henceforward led by the United States, the chance to break the movement by mobilizing to that end its regional military instrument: Israel. The 1967 defeat marked the end of the tide that had flowed for a half-century. Its reflux was initiated by Nasser himself who chose the path of concessions to the Right (the infitah or “opening,” an opening to capitalist globalization of course) rather than the radicalization called for by, among others, the student movement (which held the stage briefly in 1970, shortly before and then after the death of Nasser). His successor, Sadat, intensified and extended the rightward turn and integrated the Muslim Brotherhood into his new autocratic system. Mubarak continued along the same path.
The following period of retreat lasted, in its turn, almost another half-century. Egypt, submissive to the demands of globalized liberalism and to U.S. strategy, simply ceased to exist as an active factor in regional or global politics. In its region the major US allies—Saudi Arabia and Israel—occupied the foreground. Israel was then able to pursue the course of expanding its colonization of occupied Palestine with the tacit complicity of Egypt and the Gulf countries.
Under Nasser Egypt had set up an economic and social system that, though subject to criticism, was at least coherent. Nasser wagered on industrialization as the way out of the colonial international specialization which was confining the country in the role of cotton exporter. His system maintained a division of incomes that favored the expanding middle classes without impoverishing the popular masses. Sadat and Mubarak dismantled the Egyptian productive system, putting in its place a completely incoherent system based exclusively on the profitability of firms most of which were mere subcontractors for the imperialist monopolies. Supposed high rates of economic growth, much praised for thirty years by the World Bank, were completely meaningless. Egyptian growth was extremely vulnerable. Moreover, such growth was accompanied by an incredible rise in inequality and by unemployment afflicting the majority of the country’s youth. This was an explosive situation. It exploded.
The apparent “stability of the regime,” boasted of by successive U.S. officials like Hillary Clinton, was based on a monstrous police apparatus counting 1.200,000 men (the army numbering a mere 500,000) free to carry out daily acts of criminal abuse. The imperialist powers claimed that this regime was “protecting” Egypt from the threat of Islamism. This was nothing but a clumsy lie. In reality the regime had perfectly integrated reactionary political Islam (on the Wahhabite model of the Gulf) into its power structure by giving it control of education, of the courts, and of the major media (especially television). The sole permitted public speech was that of the Salafist mosques, allowing the Islamists, to boot, to pretend to make up “the opposition.” The cynical duplicity of the US establishment’s speeches (Obama no less than Bush) was perfectly adapted to its aims. The de facto support for political Islam destroyed the capacity of Egyptian society to confront the challenges of the modern world (bringing about a catastrophic decline in education and research), while by occasionally denouncing its “abuses” (like assassinations of Copts) Washington could legitimize its military interventions as actions in its self-styled “war against terrorism.” The regime could still appear “tolerable” as long as it had the safety valve provided by mass emigration of poor and middle-class workers to the oil-producing countries. The exhaustion of that system (Asian immigrants replacing those from Arabic countries) brought with it the rebirth of opposition movements. The workers’ strikes in 2007 (the strongest strikes on the African continent in the past fifty years), the stubborn resistance of small farmers threatened with expropriation by agrarian capital, and the formation of democratic protest groups among the middle classes (like the “Kefaya” and “April 6″ movements) foretold the inevitable explosion—expected by Egyptians but startling to “foreign observers.” And thus began a new phase in the tide of emancipation struggles, whose directions and opportunities for development we are now called on to analyze.
The components of the democratic movement
The “Egyptian Revolution” now underway shows that it possible to foresee an end to the neoliberal system, shaken in all its political, economic, and social dimensions. This gigantic movement of the Egyptian people links three active components: youth “repoliticized” by their own will in “modern” forms that they themselves have invented; the forces of the radical left; and the forces of the democratic middle classes.
Youth (about one million activists) spearheaded the movement. They were immediately joined by the radical left and the democratic middle classes. The Muslim Brotherhood, whose leaders had called for a boycott of the demonstrations during their first four days (sure, as they were, that the demonstrators would be routed by the repressive apparatus) only accepted the movement belatedly once its appeal, heard by the entire Egyptian people, was producing gigantic mobilizations of 15 million demonstrators.
The youth and the radical left sought in common three objectives: restoration of democracy (ending the police/military regime), the undertaking of a new economic and social policy favorable to the popular masses (breaking with the submission to demands of globalized liberalism), and an independent foreign policy (breaking with the submission to the requirements of U.S. hegemony and the extension of U.S. military control over the whole planet). The democratic revolution for which they call is a democratic social and anti-imperialist revolution.
Although the youth movement is diversified in its social composition and in its political and ideological expressions, it places itself as a whole “on the left.” Its strong and spontaneous expressions of sympathy with the radical left testify to that.
The middle classes as a whole rally around only the democratic objective, without necessarily objecting thoroughly to the “market” (such as it is) or to Egypt’s international alignment. Not to be neglected is the role of a group of bloggers who take part, consciously or not, in a veritable conspiracy organized by the CIA. Its animators are usually young people from the wealthy classes, extremely “americanized,” who nevertheless present themselves as opponents of the established dictatorships. The theme of democracy, in the version required for its manipulation by Washington, is uppermost in their discourse on the “net.” That fact makes them active participants in the chain of counterrevolutions, orchestrated by Washington, disguised as “democratic revolutions” on the model of the East European “color revolutions.” But it would be wrong to think that this conspiracy is behind the popular revolts. What the CIA is seeking is to reverse the direction of the movement, to distance its activists from their aim of progressive social transformation and to shunt them onto different tracks. The scheme will have a good chance to succeed if the movement fails in bringing together its diverse components, identifying common strategic objectives, and inventing effective forms of organization and action. Examples of such failure are well known—look at Indonesia and the Philippines. It is worthy of note that those bloggers—writing in English rather than Arabic(!)—setting out to defend “American-style democracy,” in Egypt often present arguments serving to legitimize the Muslim Brotherhood.
The call for demonstrations enunciated by the three active components of the movement was quickly heeded by the whole Egyptian people. Repression, extremely violent during the first days (more than a thousand deaths), did not discourage those youths and their allies (who at no time, unlike in some other places, called on the Western Powers for any help). Their courage was decisive in drawing 15 million Egyptians from all the districts of big and small cities, and even villages, into demonstrations of protest lasting days (and sometimes nights) on end. Their overwhelming political victory had as its effect that fear switched sides. Obama and Hillary Clinton discovered that they had to dump Mubarak, whom they had hitherto supported, while the army leaders ended their silence and refused to take over the task of repression—thus protecting their image—and wound up deposing Mubarak and several of his more important henchmen.
The generalization of the movement among the whole Egyptian people represents in itself a positive challenge. For this people, like any other, are far from making up a “homogeneous bloc.” Some of its major components are without any doubt a source of strength for the perspective of radicalization. The 5-million-strong working class’s entry into the battle could be decisive. The combative workers, through numerous strikes, have advanced further in constructing the organizations they began in 2007. There are already more than fifty independent unions. The stubborn resistance of small farmers against the expropriations permitted by abolition of the agrarian reform laws (the Muslim Brotherhood cast its votes in parliament in favor of that vicious legislation on the pretext that private property was “sacred” to Islam and that the agrarian reform had been inspired by the Devil, a communist!) is another radicalizing factor for the movement. What is more, a vast mass of “the poor” took active part in the demonstrations of February 2011 and often are participating in neighborhood popular committees “in defense of the revolution.” The beards, the veils, the dress-styles of these “poor folk” might give the impression that in its depths Egyptian society is “Islamic,” even that it is mobilized by the Muslim Brotherhood. In reality, they erupted onto the stage and the leaders of that organization had no choice but to go along. A race is thus underway: who—the Brotherhood and its (Salafist) Islamist associates or the democratic alliance—will succeed in forming effective alliances with the still-confused masses and even to (a term I reject) “get them under discipline”?
Conspicuous progress in constructing the united front of workers and democratic forces is happening in Egypt. In April 2011 five socialist-oriented parties (the Egyptian Socialist Party, the Popular Democratic Alliance—made up of a majority of the membership of the former “loyal-left” Tagammu party, the Democratic Labor Party, the trotskyist Socialist Revolutionary Party, and the Egyptian Communist Party—which had been a component of Tagammu) established an Alliance of Socialist Forces through which they committed themselves to carry out their struggles in common. In parallel, a National Council (Maglis Watany) was established by all the active political and social forces of the movement (the socialist-oriented parties, the divers democratic parties, the independent unions, the peasant organizations, the networks of young people, numerous social associations). The Council has about 150 members, the Muslim Brotherhood and the right-wing parties refusing to participate and thus reaffirming their well-known opposition to continuation of the revolutionary movement.
Confronting the democratic movement: the reactionary bloc
Just as in past periods of rising struggle, the democratic social and anti-imperialist movement in Egypt is up against a powerful reactionary bloc. This bloc can perhaps be identified in terms of its social composition (its component classes, of course) but it is just as important to define it in terms of its means of political intervention and the ideological discourse serving its politics.
In social terms, the reactionary bloc is led by the Egyptian bourgeoisie taken as a whole. The forms of dependent accumulation operative over the past forty years brought about the rise of a rich bourgeoisie, the sole beneficiary of the scandalous inequality accompanying that “globalized liberal” model. They are some tens of thousands—not of “innovating entrepreneurs” as the World Bank likes to call them but of millionaires and billionaires all owing their fortunes to collusion with the political apparatus (corruption being an organic part of their system). This is a comprador bourgeoisie (in the political language current in Egypt the people term them “corrupt parasites”). They make up the active support for Egypt’s placement in contemporary imperialist globalization as an unconditional ally of the United States. Within its ranks this bourgeoisie counts numerous military and police generals, “civilians” with connections to the state and to the dominant National Democratic party created by Sadat and Mubarak, and of religious personalities—the whole leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and the leading sheikhs of the Al Azhar University are all of them “billionaires.” Certainly there still exists a bourgeoisie of active small-and-medium entrepreneurs. But they are the victims of the racketeering system put in place by the comprador bourgeoisie, usually reduced to the status of subordinate subcontractors for the local monopolists, themselves mere transmission belts for the foreign monopolies. In the construction industry this system is the general rule: the “greats” snap up the state contracts and then subcontract the work to the “smalls.” That authentically entrepreneurial bourgeoisie is in sympathy with the democratic movement.
The rural side of the reactionary bloc has no less importance. It is made up of rich peasants who were the main beneficiaries of Nasser’s agrarian reform, replacing the former class of wealthy landlords. The agricultural cooperatives set up by the Nasser regime included both rich and poor peasants and so they mainly worked for the benefit of the rich. But the regime also had measures to limit possible abuse of the poor peasants. Once those measures had been abandoned, on the advice of the World Bank, by Sadat and Mubarak, the rural rich went to work to hasten the elimination of the poor peasants. In modern Egypt the rural rich have always constituted a reactionary class, now more so than ever. They are likewise the main sponsors of conservative Islam in the countryside and, through their close (often family) relationships with the officials of the state and religious apparatuses (in Egypt the Al Azhar university has a status equivalent to an organized Muslim Church) they dominate rural social life. What is more, a large part of the urban middle classes (especially the army and police officers but likewise the technocrats and medical/legal professionals) stem directly from the rural rich.
This reactionary bloc has strong political instruments in its service: the military and police forces, the state institutions, the privileged National Democratic political party (a de facto single party) that was created by Sadat, the religious apparatus (Al Azhar), and the factions of political Islam (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists). The military assistance (amounting to some $1.5 billion annually) extended by the US to the Egyptian Army never went toward the country’s defensive capacity. On the contrary. its effect was dangerously destructive through the systematic corruption that, with the greatest cynicism, was not merely known and tolerated but actively promoted. That “aid” allowed the highest ranks to take over for themselves some important parts of the Egyptian comprador economy, to the point that “Army Incorporated” (Sharika al geish) became a commonplace term. The High Command, who made themselves responsible for directing the Transition, is thus not at all “neutral” despite its effort to appear so by distancing itself from the acts of repression. The “civilian” government chosen by and obedient to it, made up largely of the less-conspicuous men from the former regime, has taken a series of completely reactionary measures aimed at blocking any radicalization of the movement. Among those measures are a vicious antistrike law (on the pretext of economic revival), and a law placing severe restrictions on the formation of political parties, aimed at confining the electoral game to the tendencies of political Islam (especially the Muslim Brotherhood), which are already well organized thanks to their systematic support by the former regime. Nevertheless, despite all that, the attitude of the army remains, at bottom, unforeseeable. In spite of the corruption of its cadres (the rank and file are conscripts, the officers professionals) nationalist sentiment has still not disappeared entirely. Moreover, the army resents having in practice lost most of its power to the police. In these circumstances, and because the movement has forcefully expressed its will to exclude the army from political leadership of the country, it is very likely that the High Command will seek in the future to remain behind the scenes rather than to present its own candidates in the coming elections.
Though it is clear that the police apparatus has remained intact (their prosecution is not contemplated) like the state apparatus in general (the new rulers all being veteran regime figures), the National Democratic Party vanished in the tempest and its legal dissolution has been ordered. But we can be certain that the Egyptian bourgeoisie will make sure that its party is reborn under a different label or labels.
Political Islam
The Muslim Brotherhood makes up the only political force whose existence was not merely tolerated but actively promoted by the former regime. Sadat and Mubarak turned over to them control over three basic institutions: education, the courts, and television. The Muslim Brotherhood have never been and can never be “moderate,” let alone “democratic.” Their leader—the murchid (Arabic word for “guide”—Führer) is self-appointed and its organization is based on the principle of disciplined execution of the leaders’ orders without any sort of discussion. Its top leadership is made up entirely of extremely wealthy men (thanks, in part, to financing by Saudi Arabia—which is to say, by Washington), its secondary leadership of men from the obscurantist layers of the middle classes, its rank-and-file by lower-class people recruited through the charitable services run by the Brotherhood (likewise financed by the Saudis), while its enforcement arm is made up of militias (the baltaguis) recruited among the criminal element.
The Muslim Brotherhood are committed to a market-based economic system of complete external dependence. They are in reality a component of the comprador bourgeoisie. They have taken their stand against large strikes by the working class and against the struggles of poor peasants to hold on to their lands. So the Muslim Brotherhood are “moderate” only in the double sense that they refuse to present any sort of economic and social program, thus in fact accepting without question reactionary neoliberal policies, and that they are submissive de facto to the enforcement of U.S, control over the region and the world. They thus are useful allies for Washington (and does the U.S. have a better ally than their patron, the Saudis?) which now vouches for their “democratic credentials.”
Nevertheless, the United States cannot admit that its strategic aim is to establish “Islamic” regimes in the region. It needs to maintain the pretense that “we are afraid of this.” In this way it legitimizes its “permanent war against terrorism” which in reality has quite different objectives: military control over the whole planet in order to guarantee that the US-Europe-Japan triad retains exclusive access to its resources. Another benefit of that duplicity is that it allows it to mobilize the “Islamophobic” aspects of public opinion. Europe, as is well known, has no strategy of its own in the region and is content from day to day to go along with the decisions of Washington. More than ever it is necessary to point out clearly this true duplicity in U.S. strategy, which has quite effectively manipulated its deceived public’s opinions. The United States (with Europe going along) fears more than anything a really democratic Egypt that would certainly turn its back to its alignments with economic liberalism and with the aggressive strategy of NATO and the United States. They will do all they can to prevent a democratic Egypt, and to that end will give full support (hypocritically disguised) to the false Muslim Brotherhood alternative which has been shown to be only a minority within the movement of the Egyptian people for real change.
The collusion between the imperialist powers and political Islam is, of course, neither new nor particular to Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, from its foundation in 1927 up to the present, has always been a useful ally for imperialism and for the local reactionary bloc. It has always been a fierce enemy of the Egyptian democratic movements. And the multibillionaires currently leading the Brotherhood are not destined to go over to the democratic cause! Political Islam throughout the Muslim world is quite assuredly a strategic ally of the United States and its NATO minority partners. Washington armed and financed the Taliban, who they called “Freedom Fighters,” in their war against the national/popular regime (termed “communist”) in Afghanistan before, during, and after the Soviet intervention. When the Taliban shut the girls’ schools created by the “communists” there were “democrats” and even “feminists” at hand to claim that it was necessary to “respect traditions!”
In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood are now supported by the “traditionalist” Salafist tendency, who also are generously financed by the Gulf States. The Salafists (fanatical Wahhabites, intolerant of any other interpretation of Islam) make no bones about their extremism, and they are behind a systematic murder campaign against Copts. It is scarcely conceivable that such operations could be carried out without the tacit support (and sometimes even greater complicity) of the state apparatus, especially of the courts which had mainly been turned over to the Muslim Brotherhood. This strange division of labor allows the Muslim Brotherhood to appear moderate: which is what Washington pretends to believe. Nevertheless, violent clashes among the Islamist religious groups in Egypt are to be expected. That is on account of the fact that Egyptian Islam has historically mainly been Sufist, the Sufi brotherhoods even now grouping 15 million Egyptian muslims. Sufism represents an open, tolerant, Islam—insisting on the importance of individual beliefs rather than on ritual practices (they say “there are as many paths to God as there are individuals”). The state powers have always been deeply suspicious of Sufism although, using both the carrot and the stick, they have been careful not to declare open war against it. The Wahhabi Islam of the Gulf States is at the opposite pole from Sufism: it is archaic, ritualist, conformist, declared enemy of any interpretation other than repetition of its own chosen texts, enemy of any critical spirit—which is, for it, nothing but the Devil at work. Wahhabite Islam considers itself at war with, and seeks to obliterate, Sufism, counting on support for this from the authorities in power. In response, contemporary Sufis are secularistic, even secular; they call for the separation of religion and politics (the state power and the religious authorities of Al Azhar recognized by it). The Sufis are allies of the democratic movement. The introduction of Wahhabite Islam into Egypt was begun by Rachid Reda in the 1920′s and carried on by the Muslim Brotherhood after 1927. But it only gained real vigor after the Second World War, when the oil rents of the Gulf States, supported by the United States as allies in its conflict with the wave of popular national liberation struggles in the ’60s, allowed a multiplication of their financial wherewithal.
U.S. Strategy: The Pakistan model
The three powers that dominated the Middle East stage during the period of ebb tide (1967-2011) were the United States, boss of the system, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Three very close allies, all sharing the same dread that a democratic Egypt would emerge. Such an Egypt could only be anti-imperialist and welfarist. It would depart from globalized liberalism, would render insignificant the Gulf States and the Saudis, would reawaken popular Arab solidarity and force Israel to recognize a Palestinian state.
Egypt is a cornerstone in the U.S. strategy for worldwide control. The single aim of Washington and its allies Israel and Saudi Arabia is to abort the Egyptian democratic movement, and to that end they want to impose an “Islamic regime” under the direction of the Muslim Brotherhood—the only way for them to perpetuate the submission of Egypt. The “democratic speeches” of Obama are there only to deceive a naïve public opinion, primarily that of the United States and Europe.
There is much talk of the Turkish example in order to legitimize a government by the Muslim Brotherhood (“converted to democracy!”). But that is just a smokescreen. For the Turkish Army is always there behind the scene, and though scarcely democratic and certainly a faithful ally of NATO it remains the guarantor of “secularism” in Turkey. Washington’s project, openly expressed by Hillary Clinton, Obama, and the think tanks at their service, is inspired by the Pakistan model: an “Islamic” army behind the scene, a “civilian” government run by one or more “elected” Islamic parties. Plainly, under that hypothesis, the “Islamic” Egyptian government would be recompensed for its submission on the essential points (perpetuation of economic liberalism and of the self-styled “peace treaties” permitting Israel to get on with its policy of territorial expansion) and enabled, as demagogic compensation, to pursue its projects of “Islamization of the state and of politics” and of assassinating Copts! Such a beautiful democracy has Washington designed for Egypt! Obviously, Saudi Arabia supports the accomplishment of that project with all its (financial) resources. Riyadh knows perfectly well that its regional hegemony (in the Arab and Muslim worlds) requires that Egypt be reduced to insignificance. Which is to be done through “Islamization of the state and of politics”; in reality, a Wahhabite Islamization with all its effects, including anti-Copt pogroms and the denial of equal rights to women.
Is such a form of Islamization possible? Perhaps, but at the price of extreme violence. The battlefield is Article 2 of the overthrown regime’s constitution. This article stipulating that “sharia is the origin of law” was a novelty in the political history of Egypt. Neither the 1923 constitution nor that of Nasser contained anything of the sort. It was Sadat who put it into his new constitution with the triple support of Washington (“traditions are to be respected”!), of Riyadh (“the Koran is all the constitution needed”), and of Tel Aviv (“Israel is a Jewish State”).
The project of the Muslim Brotherhood remains the establishment of a theocratic state, as is shown by its attachment to Article 2 of the Sadat/Mubarak Constitution. What is more, the organization’s most recent program further reinforces that medievalistical outlook by proposing to set up a “Council of Ulemas” empowered to assure that any proposed legislation be in conformity with the requirements of sharia. Such a Religious Constitutional Council would be analogous to the one that, in Iran, is supreme over the “elected” government. It is the regime of a religious single superparty, all parties standing for secularism becoming “illegal.” Their members, like non-Muslims (Copts), would thus be excluded from political life. Despite all that, the authorities in Washington and Europe talk as though the recent opportunist and disingenuous declaration by the Brotherhood that it was giving up its theocratic project (its program staying unchanged) should be taken seriously. Are the CIA experts, then, unable to read Arabic? The conclusion is inescapable: Washington would see the Brotherhood in power, guaranteeing that Egypt remain in its grip and that of liberal globalization, rather than that power be held by democrats who would be very likely to challenge the subaltern status of Egypt. The recently created Party of Freedom and Justice, explicitly on the Turkish model, is nothing but an instrument of the Brotherhood. It offers to admit Copts (!) which signifies that they have to accept the theocratic Muslim state enshrined in the Brotherhood’s program if they want the right to “participate” in their country’s political life. Going on the offensive, the Brotherhood is setting up “unions” and “peasant organizations” and a rigamarole of diversely named “political parties,” whose sole objective is foment division in the now-forming united fronts of workers. peasants. and democrats—to the advantage, of course, of the counterrevolutionary bloc.
Will the Egyptian democratic movement be able to strike that Article from the forthcoming new constitution? The question can be answered only through going back to an examination of the political, ideological, and cultural debates that have unfolded during the history of modern Egypt.
In fact, we can see that the periods of rising tide were characterized by a diversity of openly expressed opinions, leaving religion (always present in society) in the background. It was that way during the first two-thirds of the 19th century (from Mohamed Ali to Khedive Ismail). Modernization themes (in the form of enlightened despotism rather than democracy) held the stage. It was the same from 1920 through 1970: open confrontation of views among “bourgeois democrats” and “communists” staying in the foreground until the rise of Nasserism. Nasser shut down the debate, replacing it with a populist pan-Arab, though also “modernizing”, discourse. The contradictions of this system opened the way for a return of political Islam. It is to be recognized, contrariwise, that in the ebb-tide phases such diversity of opinion vanished, leaving the space free for medievalism, presented as Islamic thought, that arrogates to itself a monopoly over government-authorized speech. From 1880 to 1920 the British built that diversion channel in various ways, notably by exiling (mainly to Nubia) all modernist Egyptian thinkers and actors who had been educated since the time of Mohamed Ali. But it is also to be noted that the “opposition” to British occupation also placed itself within that medievalistical consensus. The Nadha (begun by Afghani and continued by Mohamed Abdou) was part of that deviation, linked to the Ottomanist delusion advocated by the new Nationalist Party of Moustapha Kamil and Mohammad Farid. There should be no surprise that toward the end of that epoch this deviation led to the ultra-reactionary writings of Rachid Reda, which were then taken up by Hassan el Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.
It was the same again in the ebb-tide years 1970-2010. The official discourse (of Sadat and Mubarak), perfectly Islamist (as proven by their insertion of sharia into the constitution and their yielding essential powers to the Muslim Brotherhood), was equally that of the false opposition, alone tolerated, which was sermonizing in the Mosque. Because of this that Article 2 might seem solidly anchored in “general opinion” (the “street” as American pundits like to call it). The devastating effects of the depolarization systematically enforced during the ebb-tide periods is not to be underestimated. The slope can never easily be reascended. But it is not impossible. The current debates in Egypt are centered, explicitly or implicitly, on the supposed “cultural” (actually, Islamic) dimensions of this challenge. And there are signposts pointing in a positive direction: the movement making free debate unavoidable—only a few weeks sufficed for the Brotherhood’s slogan “Islam is the Solution” to disappear from all the demonstrations, leaving only specific demands about concretely transforming society (freedom to express opinions and to form unions, political parties, and other social organizations; improved wages and workplace rights; access to landownership, to schools, to health services; rejection of privatizations and calls for nationalizations, etc.). A signal that does not mislead: in April elections to the student organization, where five years ago (when its discourse was the only permitted form of supposed opposition) the Brotherhood’s candidates had obtained a crushing 80% majority, their share of the vote fell to 20%! Yet the other side likewise sees ways to parry the “democracy danger.” Insignificant changes to the Mubarak constitution (continuing in force), proposed by a committee made up exclusively of Islamists chosen by the army high command and approved in a hurried April referendum (an official 23% negative vote but a big affirmative vote imposed through electoral fraud and heavy blackmail by the mosques) obviously left Article 2 in place. Presidential and Legislative elections under that constitution are scheduled for September/October 2011. The democratic movement contends for a longer “democratic transition,” which would allow its discourse actually to reach those big layers of the muslim lower classes still at a loss to understand the events. But as soon as the uprising began Obama made his choice: a short, orderly (that is to say without any threat to the governing apparatus) transition, and elections that would result in victory for the Islamists. As is well known, “elections” in Egypt, as elsewhere in the world, are not the best way to establish democracy but often are the best way to set a limit to democratic progress.
Finally. some words about “corruption.” Most speech from the “transition regime” concentrates on denouncing it and threatening prosecution (Mubarak, his wife, and some others arrested, but what will actually happen remaining to be seen). This discourse is certainly well received, especially by the major part of naïve public opinion. But they take care not to analyze its deeper causes and to teach that “corruption” (presented in the moralizing style of American speech as individual immorality) is an organic and necessary component in the formation of the bourgeoisie. And not merely in the case of Egypt and of the Southern countries in general, where if a comprador bourgeoisie is to be formed the sole way for that to take place is in association with the state apparatus. I maintain that at the stage of generalized monopoly capitalism corruption has become a basic organic component in the reproduction of its accumulation model: rent-seeking monopolies require the active complicity of the State. Its ideological discourse (the “liberal virus”) proclaims “state hands off the economy” while its practice is “state in service to the monopolies.”
The storm zone
Mao was not wrong when he affirmed that really existing (which is to say, naturally imperialist) capitalism had nothing to offer to the peoples of the three continents (the periphery made up of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—a “minority” counting 85% of world population!) and that the South was a “storm zone,” a zone of repeated revolts potentially (but only potentially) pregnant with revolutionary advances toward socialist transcendence of capitalism.
The “Arab spring” is enlisted in that reality. The case is one of social revolts potentially pregnant with concrete alternatives that in the long run can register within a socialist perspective. Which is why the capitalist system, monopoly capital dominant at the world level, cannot tolerate the development of these movements. It will mobilize all possible means of destabilization, from economic and financial pressures up to military threats. It will support, according to circumstances, either fascist and fascistic false alternatives or the imposition of military dictatorships. Not a word from Obama’s mouth is to be believed. Obama is Bush with a different style of speech. Duplicity is built into the speech of all the leaders of the imperialist triad (United States, Western Europe, Japan).
I do not intend in this article to examine in as much detail each of the ongoing movements in the Arab world (Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen, et.al.) The components of the movement differ from one country to the other, just like the forms of their integration into imperialist globalization and the structures of their established regimes.
The Tunisian revolt sounded the starting gun, and surely it strongly encouraged the Egyptians. Moreover, the Tunisian movement has one definite advantage: the semi-secularism introduced by Bourguiba can certainly not be called into question by Islamists returning from their exile in England. But at the same time the Tunisian movement seems unable to challenge the extraverted development model inherent in liberal capitalist globalization.
Libya is neither Tunisia nor Egypt. The ruling group (Khaddafi) and the forces fighting it are in no way analogous to their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts. Khaddafi has never been anything but a buffoon, the emptiness of whose thought was reflected in his notorious “Green Book.” Operating in a still-archaic society Khaddafi could indulge himself in successive “nationalist and socialist” speeches with little bearing on reality, and the next day proclaim himself a “liberal.” He did so to “please the West!” as though the choice for liberalism would have no social effects. But it had and, as is commonplace, it worsened living conditions for the majority of Libyans. Those conditions then gave rise to the well-known explosion, of which the country’s regionalists and political Islamists took immediate advantage. For Libya has never truly existed as a nation. It is a geographical region separating the Arab West from the Arab East (the Maghreb from the Mashreq). The boundary between the two goes right through the middle of Libya. Cyrenaica was historically Greek and Hellenistic, then it became Mashreqian. Tripolitania, for its part, was Roman and became Maghrebian. Because of this, regionalism has always been strong in the country. Nobody knows who the members of the National Transition Council in Benghazi really are. There may be democrats among them, but there are certainly Islamists, some among the worst of the breed, as well as regionalists. From its outset “the movement” took in Libya the form of an armed revolt fighting the army rather than a wave of civilian demonstrations. And right away that armed revolt called NATO to its aid. Thus a chance for military intervention was offered to the imperialist powers. Their aim is surely neither “protecting civilians” nor “democracy” but control over oilfields and acquisition of a major military base in the country. Of course, ever since Khaddafi embraced liberalism the Western oil companies had control over Libyan oil. But with Khaddafi nobody could be sure of anything. Suppose he were to switch sides tomorrow and start to play ball with the Indians and the Chinese? But there is something else more important. In 1969 Khaddafi had demanded that the British and Americans leave the bases they had kept in the country since World War II. Currently the United States needs to find a place in Africa for its Africom (the US military command for Africa, an important part of its alignment for military control over the world but which still has to be based in Stuttgart!). The African Union refusing to accept it, until now no African country has dared to do so. A lackey emplaced at Tripoli (or Benghazi) would surely comply with all the demands of Washington and its NATO lieutenants.
The components of the Syrian revolt have yet to make their programs known. Undoubtedly, the rightward drift of the Baathist regime, gone over to neoliberalism and singularly passive with regard to the Israeli occupation of the Golan, is behind the popular explosion. But CIA intervention cannot be excluded: there is talk of groups penetrating into Diraa across the neighboring Jordanian frontier. The mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been behind earlier revolts in Hama and Homs, is perhaps part of Washington’s scheme seeking an eventual end to the Syria/Iran alliance that gives essential support to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.
In Yemen the country was united through the defeat of progressive forces that had governed independent South Yemen. Will the movement mark a return to life of those forces? That uncertainty explains the hesitant stance of Washington and the Gulf States.
In Bahrein the revolt was crushed at birth by massacres and intervention by the Saudi army, without the dominant media (including Al Jazeera) having much to say about it. As always, the double standard.
The “Arab revolt,” though its most recent expression, is not the only example showing the inherent instability of the “storm zone.”
A first wave of revolutions, if that is what they are to be called, had swept away some dictatorships in Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia) and Africa (Mali) which had been installed by imperialism and the local reactionary blocs. But there the United States and Europe succeeded in aborting the potential of those popular movements, which had sometimes aroused gigantic mobilizations. The United States and Europe seek in the Arab world a repetition of what happened in Mali, Indonesia, and the Philippines: “to change everything in order that nothing changes!” There, after the popular movements had gotten rid of their dictators, the imperialist powers undertook to preserve their essential interests by setting up governments aligned with their foreign-policy interests and with neoliberalism. It is noteworthy that in the Muslim countries (Mali, Indonesia) they mobilized political Islam to that end.
In contrast, the wave of emancipation movements that swept over South America allowed real advances in three directions: democratization of state and society; adoption of consistent anti-imperialist positions; and entry onto the path of progressive social reform
The prevailing media discourse compares the “democratic revolts” of the third world to those that put an end to East-European “socialism” following the fall of the “Berlin Wall.” This is nothing but a fraud, pure and simple. Whatever the reasons (and they were understandable) for those revolts, they signed on to the perspective of an annexation of the region by the imperialist powers of Western Europe (primarily to the profit of Germany). In fact, reduced thenceforward to a status as one of developed capitalist Europe’s peripheries, the countries of Eastern Europe are still on the eve of experiencing their own authentic revolts. There are already signs foretelling this, especially in the former Yugoslavia.
Revolts, potentially pregnant with revolutionary advances, are foreseeable nearly everywhere on those three continents which more than ever remain the storm zone, by that fact refuting all the cloying discourse on “eternal capitalism” and the stability, the peace, the democratic progress attributed to it. But those revolts, to become revolutionary advances, will have to overcome many obstacles: on the one hand they will have to overcome the weaknesses of the movement, arrive at positive convergence of its components, formulate and implement effective strategies; on the other they will have to turn back the interventions (including military interventions) of the imperialist triad. Any military intervention of the United States and NATO in the affairs of the Southern countries must be prohibited no matter its pretext, even seemingly benign “humanitarian” intervention. Imperialism seeks to permit neither democracy nor social progress to those countries. Once it has won the battle, the lackeys whom it sets up to rule will still be enemies of democracy. One can only regret profoundly that the European “left,” even when its claims to be radical, has lost all understanding of what imperialism really is.
The discourse currently prevailing calls for the implementation of “international law” authorizing, in principle, intervention whenever the fundamental rights of a people are being trampled. But the necessary conditions allowing for movement in that direction are just not there. The “international community” does not exist. It amounts to the U.S. embassy, followed automatically by those of Europe. No need to enumerate the long list of such worse-that-unfortunate interventions (Iraq, for example) with criminal outcomes. Nor to cite the “double standard” common to them all (obviously one thinks of the trampled rights of the Palestinians and the unconditional support of Israel, of the innumerable dictatorships still being supported in Africa).
Springtime for the people of the South and autumn for capitalism
The “springtime” of the Arab peoples, like that which the peoples of Latin America are experiencing for two decades now and which I refer to as the second wave of awakening of the Southern peoples—the first having unfolded in the 20th century until the counteroffensive unleashed by neoliberal capitalism/imperialism—takes on various forms, running from explosions aimed against precisely those autocracies participating in the neoliberal ranks to challenges by “emerging countries” to the international order. These springtimes thus coincide with the “autumn of capitalism,” the decline of the capitalism of globalized, financialized, generalized, monopolies. These movements begin, like those of the preceding century, with peoples and states of the system’s periphery regaining their independence, retaking the initiative in transforming the world. They are thus above all anti-imperialist movements and so are only potentially anti-capitalist. Should these movements succeed in converging with the other necessary reawakening, that of the workers in the imperialist core, a truly socialist perspective could be opened for the whole human race. But that is in no way a predestined “historical necessity.” The decline of capitalism might open the way for a long transition toward socialism, but it might equally well put humanity on the road to generalized barbarism. The ongoing U.S. project of military control over the planet by its armed forces, supported by their NATO lieutenants, the erosion of democracy in the imperialist core countries, and the medievalistical rejection of democracy within Southern countries in revolt (taking the form of “fundamentalist” semi-religious delusions disseminated by political Islam, political Hinduism, political Buddhism) all work together toward that dreadful outcome. At the current time the struggle for secularist democratization is crucial for the perspective of popular emancipation, crucial for opposition to the perspective of generalized barbarism.
Complementary readings
Hassan Riad, L’Egypte nassérienne (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1964)
Samir Amin, La nation arabe (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1976)
Samir Amin, A life looking forward, Memories of an independent Marxist (London: Zed Books, 2006)
Samir Amin, L’éveil du Sud (Paris: Le temps des cerises, 2008)
The reader will find there my interpretations of the achievements of the viceroy Muhammad Ali (1805-1848) and of the Khedives who succeeded him, especially Ismail (1867-1879); of the Wafd (1920-1952); of the positions taken by Egyptian communists in regard to nasserism; and of the deviation represented by the Nahda from Afghani to Rachid Reda.
Gilbert Achcar, Les Arabes et la Shoah (Arles: Actes Sud, 2009)
The best analysis of the components of political Islam (Rachid Reda, the Muslim Brotherhood, the modern Salafists).
Concerning the relationship between the North/South conflict and the opposition between the beginning of a socialist transition and the strategic organization of capitalism, see:
Samir Amin, La crise, sortir de la crise du capitalisme ou sortir du capitalisme en crise ? (Paris: Le Temps des Cerises, 2009)
Samir Amin, The law of worldwide value (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011)
Samir Amin, The world we wish to see (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008)
Samir Amin, “The Trajectory of Historical Capitalism and Marxism’s Tricontinental Vocation,” Monthly Review 62, no. 9 (February 2011)
Gilbert Achcar, Le choc des barbaries (Bruxelles, Cairo and Paris: Complexe, 2011)